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Introduction
The price that a company charges for its products or services' is the most
explicit manifestation of that company's business activity, apart from the
fact of making the product or service available, in the first place. Product
pricing has an immediate and direct effect on the company's customers and
competitors, and it will indirectly impact, to a varying degree depending on
the company's strength and overall importance, suppliers and third parties,
including fiscal authorities and society at large. Most notably, the price of a
given product affects the company itself, because it determines more than
other factors the profitability of the product. Product pricing, therefore, is
the key ingredient of a company's financial performance. In a free market
economy, where the attainment of a profit is, legitimately, the ultimate goal
of any business activity, product pricing must consequently represent a
prime concern for the businessman who decides the company's conduct. It
seems natural for him always to select aprice which maximizesprofits, or to
establish the price at a level which allows his company to obtain the biggest
share of total sales possible in the market.
The methodology and practices employed by businessmen to arrive at a
specific price for a product may, depending on a multitude of reasons, vary,
but at all times and without exception, the methodology and practices
employed are subject to the scrutiny of laws in every country that allows the
free enterprise system. This is the direct result of the enormous impact of a
company's product pricing on virtually everybody involved in the economic
process; the law simply cannot be neutral to such an important facet of
business life. EEC law is no exception. The Treaty of Rome, in its Articles
*Dr. Toepke practices law in New York and West Germany.
'This article addresses the pricing of services as much as the pricing of tangible products,
unless specifically excluded. EEC law makes no distinction between the two; cf. the Court's
judgment in General Motors, where a particular inspection service offered by GM was the
main substantive issue. In this sense, "product pricing" will be used throughout this article as
a generic term for all forms of pricing activities.
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85 and 86, addresses the question of product pricing, specifically, and,
unlike many other antitrust laws, these provisions are rather explicit in that
they prohibit unfair and discriminatory prices, as well as collusive pricefixing.
This shows that EEC law will not tolerate exploitative pricing practices or
anticompetitive pricing practices, or a combination of both (as is usually the
case with price discrimination).
At first sight, these prohibitions appear sufficiently clear. However, given
the natural inclination of profit maximization or market share achievement
on the part of the business executive, many questions remain with respect to
their practical implementation in day-to-day business life. For one thing, it
must be pointed out that EEC law, in its application to product pricing, has
a unique role in the sense that it regulates behavior occurring in a much less
homogeneous market than any national market, including the United States.
There are differences in economic conditions among member states (not the
least of which are caused by remaining discrepancies in national legislation
regarding taxes), which result in price differences, unless the company
involved ignores these pre-existing differences which exist throughout the
community. Other uncertainties involve the question how exploitative pric-
ing can be proved; in other words, what is the level of unfairness in product
pricing? Is an "unfair" price necessarily an excessively high price or can it
also be a price below cost? How can price differences for the same product
between countries be justified? Does the exchange of pricing information
amount to illegal price fixing, etc., etc. The international businessman sell-
ing the same, or virtually the same, product throughout the Common Mar-
ket needs to have the answers to questions such as these, if he is to avoid
legal problems in the EEC.
Two statements can be made at the outset which will provide some basic
guidance in the area of product pricing. First, a company acting alone, i.e.,
independently of outside contacts, can do what it wishes as regards its prod-
uct pricing, unless it is a dominant firm. In other words, single-company
conduct of a nondominant enterprise escapes the prohibitions of EEC law;
such a firm can price its products as it sees fit. In product pricing as much
as in all other areas of business conduct, the threshold of dominance and
the concerted action with other firms establish the boundaries short of
which Articles 85 and 86 do not apply. This says that a particular pricing
practice which would be illegal if employed by a dominant enterprise, or
through an agreement between two independent companies, can be used
with impunity by any other firm, acting on its own. Secondly, with respect
to the enforcement of EEC law in the area ofpricing, it can be stated that the
Commission will act to keep the Common Market open and unified. 2 This
is in spite of remaining differences of historical, cultural and legislative
character between the member states, which have resulted in dissimilar
2This is described by the Commission itself as "the first fundamental objective" of the com-
munity's competition policy cf. Comp. Rep. 1979 (Ninth), Introduction, p. 8.
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plateaus in the European pricing landscape. It means that prosecution will
most likely occur in the case of companies attempting to divide up the market,
through restrictive agreements or abusive practices, so as to apply artificial
price differences or impose unfair prices on their customers. The commis-
sion, however, will not act as a price control agency.3
Although it is not a normal pricing practice and against a businessman's
natural inclinations, in certain extreme economic circumstances a company
may want to price a product below cost. However, where such pricing is
based on ulterior motives, for instance to eliminate a competitor, the prac-
tice is commonly referred to as predatory pricing and is illegal. The phe-
nomenon has attracted much attention in the United States,4 although
proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely rare.- The antitrust
laws were, in a way, a response to a broadly perceived danger at the time of
their introduction in America that powerful companies might sacrifice
short-term revenues and cut their prices for the purpose of driving competi-
tors out of the field, only to recoup their losses through much higher profits
in the future, free from any competition. At that time, certain companies
had achieved monopoly power or something close to it, and they were exer-
cising a control over people, regions and industries which was felt to be
intolerable as these companies imposed as many obstacles as possible on
fair competitive opportunities for existing and potential rivals. When the
Congress acted in 1890, and again in 1914, it was the common goal of the
antitrust laws to prevent private interference with the competitive potential
of the market. This, it was felt, would lead to the preservation of a state of
effective competition whereby no single enterprise would have the power to
choose its level of prices and profits independently, by giving less and
charging more.
In Europe, the historical development was different. Laws against the
restraint of competition were enacted much later than in the United States
and without exception, only after the end of World War II. Earlier
attempts to regulate the functioning of the economy had been mainly con-
cerned with mergers of large-scale industries or the protection of individual
consumers against inflation. According to the state of the economy in the
various European countries before, during, and after the war, the aspect of
consumer protection through a direct control of prices, administered by the
3There are numerous statements to this effect from the Commission itself; cf for example
Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), Introduction, p. 10; also Comp. Rep. 1975 (Fifth), point 76, with
respect to the United Brands decision, where the Commission declared: "In taking this action,
the Commission had no wish to set itself up as a price-control authority or to interfere in
internal price setting by examining cost components or the like." See also the Commission's
answer to Parliamentary Question No. 654/78 by Mr. Schyns (OJ No. C 5 of January 8, 1979;
p. 27) where the Commission stated that it "does not see how the establishment of a Commu-
nity-level price control system could usefully contribute to the fight against inflation," (CCH)
§ 10,105 at p. 10,364.
'Cf. P. Areeda and D.F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, HARv. L. REv. (1975) Vol. 88, No. 4, p. 697 et seq.
5 d at 699.
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state, had a more or less important influence at different times. Thus, it is
no surprise that European laws, when they were finally adopted, were
mainly concerned with the protection of consumers and that, in the field of
pricing, they took issue with high prices charged by companies in a domi-
nant position, or as a result of restrictive agreements. Low prices, tradition-
ally, are not a problem in Europe and to this date predatory pricing has not
presented any questions in the EEC.6 By the same token, no one in the
United States is concerned with high prices from a legal viewpoint, unless
they are monopoly prices. The safeguards introduced by the U.S. antitrust
laws, which make for the preservation of effective competition, are deemed
sufficient to force a company with a high price policy either to give it up or
to lose ground to its rivals.
Obviously, the economic factors of competition work in the same way in
Europe as they do in the United States. And, as the European Court of
Justice has made it clear in many of its judgments, the EEC antitrust provi-
sions do protect the condition of fair and undistorted competition just as
much as the consumer.7 Thus, a growing trend of convergence between U.S.
and EEC antitrust laws can clearly be detected. As a result, despite histori-
cal difference of origin of the two systems, the concerns with respect to
product pricing ought to become the same over time. One important dis-
tinction will remain and the international businessman must be aware of it;
this is the difference, as regards the individual company's strength, between
"dominance" and "monopoly power." The threshold of dominance is
reached much earlier than that of monopoly power, and consequently, the
trigger effect which this has in respect of a company's pricing is to be
watched more carefully when doing business in the EEC. In addition, Arti-
cle 86 contains the explicit prohibition of "unfair" prices which is not
expressed in any of the U.S. statutes. Given the historical background of
European laws and the resulting attitude of European antitrust enforcement
agencies, it is likely that "unfair" will continue to be interpreted as "too
high" for many years to come. And it is also likely that these enforcement
agencies, including the EEC Commission, will attack cases of perceived
"unfair" pricing. As has happened in the past, this attack will occur most
'No decision exists in which the question of illegally low prices had to be ruled on, either by
the Commission or the Court. The Commission, however, in its Memorandum on Concentra-
tions, 1966, stated its position to the effect that pricing below cost by a dominant enterprise
would be an abuse if it was intended to eliminate a competitor or compel it to merge against its
will or on unfavourable terms; cited after J. TEMPLE LANG, ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, PRESENT AND FUTURE: SOME ASPECTS; International Anti-
trust, Fifth Annual Fordham Corporate Law Institute; Law & Business, Inc. New York 1979;
p. 25 et seq. at p. 51. Apparently, no further deliberations were held as to what constitutes
"below cost" in a specific case. Areeda and Turner, supra note 4, have demonstrated that the
only meaningful and practical way to prove predation is to focus on cost below marginal or
average variable cost. Over the last few years, this seems to have become the standard guide-
post for judging predatory pricing in the United States.
'The line of cases started with Italy v. EEC Council, infra note 21; the latest decision provid-
ing clear authority to this end is Hoffmann-LaRoche, (CCH) § 8527 at 7559 (paragraph 125 of
the original judgment).
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probably in the area of consumer goods. The thought of attacking a com-
pany's product pricing as too low must appear almost perverse to any Euro-
pean antitrust enforcer, unless the price is clearly also anticompetitive.
From an EEC antitrust viewpoint, this leaves two main categories of
financial practices in the field of corporate pricing worthy of more detailed
discussion. Depending on the focus of the analysis, one can either distin-
guish the practices according to the legal elements of pricing, i.e., unfair
versus discriminatory, or based on the way the company goes about to
establish its prices, i.e., in collusion with other companies or independently
but from a position of dominance. The latter distinction has been chosen as
a basis for the comments which follow as it allows Articles 85 and 86 to be
analyzed, separately. Like all comments throughout this paper, the follow-
ing ones are based on actual decisions of the EEC Commission and the
Court of Justice. This way, the international businessman concerned with
product pricing will obtain the most reliable guidance available in EEC
law.
Collusive Pricing
Any agreement between two or more enterprises to fix the price of a
product or service in the European Common Market, directly or indirectly,
is prohibited, Article 85(l)(a), Treaty of Rome, provided it is capable of
affecting trade between member states and further provided that it has
anticompetitive character. Such an agreement is automatically void, Article
85(2). Generally speaking, therefore, pricefring by joint action of two or
more companies (horizontal or vertical agreement) is illegal in the EEC.
It should be remembered, however, that parent/subsidiary agreements are
exempt from Article 85 application, because parent and subsidiary compa-
nies represent one integrated company, only.8 Thus, it does not constitute
an act of illegal price fixing where a parent company establishes a price for
its EEC subsidiaries, evefi if this is done by negotiation with the subsidiary
and a subsequent "agreement" on the price, provided the parent company
has majority control over the subsidiary. It is, furthermore, appropriate to
recall that the Court of Justice has ruled on three occasions that certain
agreements escape the prohibition of Article 85 where, in view of the weak
position of the parties on the market, the effects of the agreement on compe-
tition are negligible.9 While these decisions were all made in connection
with exclusive distribution agreements, there is no convincing reason not to
apply this principle to price fixing agreements, as well. In fact, a 1975
Court judgment provides indirect authority for the statement that under de
minimis circumstances it will not be held illegal in the EEC to fix prices. In
'See judgment of Oct. 31, 1974; case 15/74; Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug; (CCH) § 8246, at
9151-57/58.
"The judgments are VMlck v. Vervaecke; LTM v. MBU; and Cadillon v. Hoss. Case 5/69;
(CCH) § 8074; Case 56/65; (CCH) § 8047; and Case 1/71; (CCH) § 8135, respectively.
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Fabricants de Papiers Peints v. Commission10 (also known as the Belgian
Wallpaper case), the Court declared with respect to effects of the subject
agreement on trade between member states that the commission's decision
"does not explain how the fact that 10 percent of Belgian imports, repre-
senting 5 percent of the total Belgian market, sold by the Groupement sub-
ject to its prices and conditions is . . . liable to affect trade between
Member States."" For this reason, the Commission's decision, which had
held the members of the Belgian wallpaper association, among other things,
to be guilty of price fixing, was annulled by the Court. The particular facts
of this case were such that there could be no dispute that the agreement
between the members of the association prevented competition on wall-
paper prices in Belgium. But if the case had been different to the extent that
only two companies had been involved and the product for which the price
was fixed had not exceeded the threshold of5percent marketshare, it is more
than likely that such an agreement would not be declared anticompetitive
by the Court.
A case of direct, horizontal price fixing in the EEC occurred in the so-
called Quinine Cartel during the 1960s, where a number of firms, among
them the Dutch company ACF Chemiefarma N.V. and the German com-
pany Boehringer Mannheim GmbH, established among themselves the
sales prices for quinine and quinidine with respect to all sales on the domes-
tic markets of the companies involved, as well as abroad. When the various
cases finally reached the Court of Justice, it had little to say regarding the
substantive violation of law. "The common fixing of selling prices by the
producers of almost all the quinine and quinidine sold in the Common
Market is likely to affect trade between the Member States and seriously
restricts competition in the Common Market."12 Price fixing, once the
actual agreement is proved, is too obvious an infringement of Article 85 as
to say much about it. Proof in this case was based on circumstantial evi-
dence. The fines imposed by the Commission on the companies involved in
the Quinine Cartel were upheld by the Court, 'with minor adjustments
downward in each case to reflect the Court's slightly different interpretation
of the evidence.' 3
Article 85(l)(a) not only prohibits direct price fixing but also all agree-
ments that fix other conditions of sale. Conditions of sale, or "trading condi-
tions" as the text of the law reads, embrace all terms and conditions that
may be included in a contract, including, but not limited to minimum and
maximum prices; delivery charges; maintenance prices; credit terms; dis-
"Court of Justice, judgment of November 26, 1975; case 73/74; (CCH) § 8335.
"Id at 7,118 (paragraph 29 of the original judgment).
"Court of Justice, judgments of July 15, 1970; Cases 41/69 (ACF Chemiefarma) and 45/69
(Boehringer); (CCH) § 8083, at 8198, and § 8085, at 8245, respectively.
13ACF Chemiefarma had to pay 200,000 u.a. instead of 210,000 and Boehringer's fine was
reduced from 190,000 u.a. to 180,000. In 1970, when these judgments were handed down, fines
of this amount were an absolute sensation. The Commission had barely begun to enforce the
provisions of EEC antitrust law that allow the imposition of fines.
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counts; payment conditions, etc. Although the law speaks expressly of
purchase and selling prices, only, there can be no doubt that lease andrental
prices are equally subject to Article 85 and any agreement fixing such prices
is also illegal (with the same provisos as mentioned before).
Article 85(1) specifies that price fixing agreements are illegal, no matter
whether the prices are fixed directly or indirectly. An example of indirect
price fixing is provided by the Court's previously cited decision in the Bel-
gian Wallpaper case. The member firms of the wallpaper association had
applied a practice whereby all retailers in Belgium who obtained their sup-
plies from the association were bound to display in their showrooms the
prices set up by, and published through, the association's price list for wall-
paper. This price list was jointly established by all member firms. Public
announcements of discounts on these prices were forbidden in the associa-
tion's conditions of sale, but each retailer was in fact free to grant such
discounts where he saw fit. When accused of price fixing, the companies
responded that they were only prohibiting the retailers to announce dis-
counts publicly, but that they were not fixing resale prices.
The Court of Justice did not accept this argument: "If a system of fixed
selling prices is clearly in conffict with [Article 85], a price-list system under
which the announcement of rebates on these prices is prohibited is equally
SO." '4 Consequently, it mattered little, said the justices, whether the Com-
mission was right or wrong in holding in its decision that the member firms
had operated an illegal system of fixed resale prices. According to the
Court, it was a violation of the price fixing prohibition, as generally
expressed in Article 85. The Belgian Wallpaper judgment therefore pro-
vides authority to declare that Article 85(1)(a)prohibits not only agreements
that fix prices which are actually charged to customers, but also all agree-
ments that fix prices that are only to be published, in other words create a
resale price maintenance scheme. This also rules out jointly established
price lists or recommended prices.
In a judgment of 1972, the Court had already passed on the subject of
jointly recommended prices. In Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Com-
mission 15 the Court of Justice had to decide whether the general conditions
of purchase and sale, including price lists, which were recommended by the
Dutch cement traders association to its memberfirms, constituted a case of
illegal price fixing. The cement traders maintained the view that these con-
ditions and prices were guidelines, only, and that member firms were not
obliged to follow the recommendations. The association showed, in fact,
that its recommended prices were not always followed by its members
because of competition from outsiders. The Commission viewed the price
recommendations as obligatory minimum prices, and took the position that
the association, in publishing these price lists, was actually fixing prices.
"Supra note 10; at 7117 (paragraph 10 of the original judgment).
"Court of Justice, judgment of October 17, 1972; case 8/72; (CCH) § 8179.
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The Court followed the Commission's argument. A system of fixed selling
prices is obviously contrary to Article 85(1)(a), said the Court, "but the same
is also true for the system of 'recommended prices.' "16 The reason pro-
vided for this conclusion is simply that it must be assumed that the terms
and conditions established by the association, including the recommended
prices, will have practical significance. "The very fact that a price is set,
even if it is only recommended, impairs competition in that it makes it pos-
sible for all participants to predict, with a sufficient degree of certainty, the
pricing policy that their competitors will follow.' 17
Once an anticompetitive agreement which fixes prices can be proved, the
Commission must, as in all other cases of alleged Article 85 infringement,
show that the agreement is liable to affect trade between member states.
With price fixing agreements, this is usually not difficult to do. In Belgian
Wallpaper, however, the accused member firms of the wallpaper associa-
tion undertook to defend themselves by advancing the argument that their
agreement did not have this required effect as the price lists in question
covered only the marketing of wallpaper on the Belgian market. The Court
dismissed the defense by stating, generally, that the fact that a price fixing
agreement only covers a single member state does not rule out the possibil-
ity that trade within the Common Market may be affected. It went on, in
fact, to say that "a restrictive agreement extending over the whole of the
territory of a member state is by its very nature liable to have the effect of
reinforcing the compartmentalization of markets on a national basis,
thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty is
designed to bring about."' 8
Article 85 not only prohibits restrictive agreements between companies
but also outlaws concertedpractices which have undesired effects on compe-
tition. In expressly distinguishing "agreements" from "concerted practices"
in Article 85(1), the Treaty attempts to show that the prohibition extends to
forms of coordination between independent companies that although not
reaching the level of a formal contract, in practice consciously substitute
cooperation for the risk of competition. As the Court of Justice has estab-
lished in its judgments disposing of the so-called Dyestuffs cases in 1972, a
concerted practice, while not containing all the elements of a contract under
civil law, can resultfrom a coordination among enterprises that becomes man-
ifest in the conduct ofitsparticpants. "If a parallelism in conduct cannot in
and of itself be considered the same as a concerted practice," said the
Court, "it can be a decisive indication of it where it leads to competitive
conditions that are not, considering the nature of the goods, the size and
'6Id at 8412.
171d.
"Supra note 10; at 7,118 (paragraph 26 of the original judgment).
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number of the enterprises concerned, and the extent of the market, normal
market conditions."' 9
During the 1960s, the Dyestuffs market had experienced three uniform
price increases throughout the community, implemented by the leading
companies in the industry, among them Europe's giants in the chemical
field, ICI of England, Bayer and BASF of Germany, and Ciba and Geigy
of Switzerland. The Commission suspected a joint action among the com-
peting firms and, in 1967, decided ex officio to initiate proceedings under
Article 3, Regulation 17/62, against a number of companies for alleged vio-
lations of Article 85. The Commission built its case on the allegation that
the accused companies had engaged in illegal "concerted practices," pro-
hibited by Article 85(1).
The evidence adduced was solely circumstantial, proving a defacto exist-
ence of a prior concert of action among the dyestuffs manufacturers. The
Commission pointed to the similarities of details of the price action, on
three occasions, as to rates and timing of the increase, the dyestuffs affected,
and the content of the instructions to raise prices which were sent to the
subsidiaries. The accused firms defended by saying that the fact that prices
were raised by the same percentage did not mean that they could not have
been set as a result of competition. In addition, they claimed that the
increases had no influence on the competitive relationships among them-
selves, since the stiff competition on those markets remained after they
occurred. The Court responded by pointing to thepurpose ofprice competi-
tion which is to keep prices at the lowest possible level and to promote trade
between member states, and to permit an optimum division of activities,
based on the productivity and adaptability of the participating enterprises.
Therefore, in the words of the Court, "it is particularly important to avoid
any action that could artificially diminish the possibilities for interpenetra-
tion of the various national markets at the consumer level."
20
Based on this principle, the Court reached the conclusion that it is "con-
trary to the Treaty's rules of competition for a producer to cooperate with
its competitors, in any manner whatsoever, in order to arrive at a coordi-
"ICI v. Commission, Case 48/69; (CCH) § 8161, at 8027, as an example of one of the Dye-
stuffs decisions. Three years later, the Court expanded on the interpretation of the term con-
certedpractices in its epic judgment deciding the Sugar cases; (CCH) § 8334. Here (at p. 8179)
the Court declared: "The criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law
of the Court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must be understood
in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that
each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt
on the Common Market including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he
makes offers or sells. Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does
not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing
and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly preclude any direct or
indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the
conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor
the course afconduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the
market" (paragraphs 173, 174 of the original judgment); emphasis added.
20 1d. at 8030.
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nated line of action for a price increase." The Court admitted, however,
that every producer is free to change his prices as he sees fit and, in doing
so, to take into account the present or foreseeable conduct of his competi-
tors. This freedom, though, does not include any conduct for the purpose
of ensuring the success of his price increase by allowing the producer to
eliminate, through coordinated action, any uncertainty as to the competi-
tors' reaction with respect to the rate of increase, the timing, the markets,
etc. Consequently, the practice of the dyestuffs manufacturers to have one
of them announcepublicly its intention to raiseprices at afuture date, and to
provide details of the price increase, which could then be followed by pub-
lic announcements of all competitors to do likewise, was held to be a "con-
certed practice" prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty. The companies
applying such practices intended, in the view of the Court of Justice, to
reduce to a minimum the risk of a change in the conditions of competition
each time they were going for a price increase. There is no reason for a
different legal interpretation in a case of joint action -to decrease prices
among competitors as this would be equally anticompetitive, for instance
by halting the decrease to a certain percentage, instead of allowing competi-
tion to take its full toll.
There are still other forms of joint action in the area of pricing that will,
under Article 85, be held illegal as collusive product pricing. Joint sales
agencies, established by competing manufacturers, are an example. The
Commission's decision of November 1979 involving three leading French
fertilizer producers and their German sales outlet Floral GmbH is a case in
point.2' Here, the Commission fined the three companies because they had
set up and managed a joint venture company in one of their export markets
to distribute their products. Although they did not enter into any exclusiv-
ity agreement with their sales company in Germany, the actual facts
showed that the three French producers sold almost all their fertilizers
which were exported to Germany through Floral GmbH. German buyers
were thus faced with a standardized supply, because competing products
were offered for sale at identical prices and on identical terms.22 Floral,
therefore, operated as an export sales agency, leaving customers in Ger-
many no economic choice between French fertilizers. The Commission
found an incident where one of the three companies refused to supply a
German wholesaler directly from France, on the grounds that the company
already had a sales outlet in Germany and did not wish to expand its sales,
there. 23 Prices payable by German dealers and users were aligned with
those of domestic manufacturers in Germany, which are between 5 and 10
percent, sometimes as much as 15 percent higher than in France.
2 Commission Decision of November 28, 1979; OJ No. L 39 of February 15, 1980; (CCH)
§ 10,184.
"Id at 10,531-13 (paragraph 1 6 of the Decision). This occurred despite the fact that all
three manufacturers sold to Floral at varying prices.
"Id at 10,531-16 (paragraph II 2 of the Decision).
Pricing of Products in the EEC 243
Based on these facts, the Commission had no difficulty finding a violation
of Article 85(1), with no way of exempting the joint action of the French
companies under Article 85(3). The application for exemption was made
by the three firms after the Commission had initiated its proceedings. It
also did not help the companies that, in October 1979, they relinquished
their control over Floral and handed the management of the company to an
outsider. The fact remained that for the preceding eleven years the French
companies had conceived their competitive intentions on the German mar-
ket in agreement with each other and in such a way as to create only the
minimum of conflict with the German manufacturers (as evidenced by the
alignment of their prices with those of domestic German suppliers). This,
the Commission said, combined with their agreement in practice to refrain
from competing with each other outside Floral, is "the nub of the anti-
competitive effect of the cooperation between them."
Information agreements represent yet another form of concerted pricing
practices, where they are concluded not for purely statistical purposes, but
allow competitors to identify individual firms and their business data. In
these cases, information is usually exchanged through a central agency.
Unless the arrangement is clearly not conducive to collusion (because it
does not permit a breakdown of individual company information on prices,
discounts, quantities and other terms of business), the Commission has con-
sistently ruled such agreements to be illegalpricefixing, and often market-
sharing. In two cases in 1977, the Commission reaffirmed its opposition to
information agreements between competitors that establish such an "'open
price" system.
In COBELPA/VNP, 24 the Commission formally decided that agree-
ments between manufacturers responsible for 80 to 90 percent of Belgian
and Dutch printing paper and stationery were violations of Article 85. The
manufacturers in question were members of their respective national
associations, and they had exchanged details of their prices, monthly sales
figures, other terms of sales, and sales destinations. They had also agreed to
respect each other's distribution channels. The Commission found "the
only possible explanation for the exchange of this information [to be] the
desire to coordinate market strategies and to create conditions of competi-
tion diverging from normal market conditions. ' 25 Conduct such as this
replaces the normal risks of price competition with pr',ctical cooperation.
The underlying purpose of the agreement was the stabdization of prices,
according to the Commission. While it may well be quite legitimate for a
businessman to operate a pricing policy which assures his firm of a steady
profitability, this cannot justify, in the eyes of the Commission, the estab-
lishment of a system of solidarity and mutual influence among competitors,
'Commission Decision of September 8, 1977; OJ No. L 242 of September 21, 1977, (CCH)
§ 9980.25Id at 10,097.
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resulting in the coordination of their pricing strategies.26
The second decision in this connection, issued a few months later, is the
Vegetable Parchment27 decision. This time, the Commission fined the main
European manufacturers of vegetable parchment (a kind of wrapping
paper) for operating, within the framework of an international economic
organization (the Genuine Vegetable Parchment Association, GVPA) an
information system, contrary to Article 85(1). The Commission found that
the companies had informed each other, through GVPA, of the level of
their prices and the quantities of vegetable. parchment that they exported
within the EEC. In addition, the Commission had evidence that in several
meetings each year the GVPA members had discussed and determined the
rates of price increases for EEC countries where no domestic producer of
vegetable parchment existed. The Commission interpreted this conduct as
a prohibited concerted practice, severely restricting competition in the
European vegetable parchment industry. In particular, the practice of con-
vening several meetings each year to set the rate of increase for the selling
price of vegetable parchment in the Benelux and Danish markets consti-
tuted an illegal price fixing in the meaning of Article 85(l)(a).28 The Com-
mission explained again that the collection and analysis of figures with the
object of preparing output and sales statistics within an industry are not
objectionable. Such tasks may properly be assigned to statistical offices or
trade associations, even where they work closely together with the enter-
prises providing the figures. The exchange of this kind of information is not
subject to Article 85.29 However, where the information system includes
the recprocated exchange of individualized business data that allows identifi-
cation of the particular company, the practice is illegal as it amounts to the
tacit sharing of markets and the fixing of prices. In Vegetable Parchment,
the Commission indicated that it considers "the regular sending to the sec-
retariat of an association of undertakings of invoices or other individual
data normally regarded as business confidences" to be a suspicious sign of
concerted practices.30 Such conduct constitutes an illegal understanding to
refrain from competing with each other, and it is clearly not designed to
bring about an improvement in production or distribution. Consequently,
an exemption under Article 85(3) is not possible in a case like this. 3'
These two Commission decisions reflect the line of thought developed by
the Court of Justice in the Sugar judgment of 1975 in relation to concerted
practices.32 There, the Court had strictly precluded from the list of permis-
sible cooperation between companies "any direct or indirect contact...
26Cf. id at 10,099.
"Commission Decision of December 23, 1977; OJ No. L 70 of March 13, 1978; (CCH)
§ 10,016.
281d. at 10,157-31 (paragraph 71 of the Decision).
"Id at 10-157-29/30 (paragraph 63 of the Decision).
'Id at 10-157-30 (paragraph 64 of the Decision).
"Id at 10,157-31/32 (paragraph 76 of the Decision).
"Cf supra note 19.
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the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market
of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the
course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contem-
plate, adopting on the market." The reason, of course, for the Court draw-
ing the line in this way is the conclusion that conduct of the proscribed kind
will lead to the elimination of the risks of price competition inherent in any
form of competitive pricing activity. This, in turn, will distort normal mar-
ket conditions to the detriment of consumers, who are now faced with coop-
eration on the part of their suppliers, instead of competition. The
international businessman, however, constantly requires information about
markets, products, customers, competitors, etc., in order to develop and
maintain a successful business strategy for his company. One of the key
elements of his required input in the area of competitive information is the
price of a given product, against which his product will compete. The busi-
nessman,for planning purposes, simply needs his competitors"prices, or else
he cannot make a meaningful decision with respect to his own product
pricing.
EEC law respects this situation and does not deprive businessmen, in the
Court's own words, of the right "to adapt themselves intelligently to the
existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors. '33 Thus, the problem
(in this context), is not the use of information about competitors but the
way in which this information is obtained. Based on the Court's objective
to enforce to the fullest extent possible the Treaty's aim of preserving com-
petition, including price competition, it would appear unobjectionable under
Article 85 where competitive prices, among other information, are obtained
without thepossibilityfor collusion with the competitors. In other words, the
decisions of the Commission in this field, and in particular the Court's rul-
ing in the Sugar case, lend authority to the statement that it will not be
interpreted as an illegal concerted practice where one company obtains the
prices of another company as long as there is no contact between them,
which might be conducive of a mutual understanding regarding their
respective pricing policies. To obtain facts is permissible, to influence plans
is not. One sure way for the businessman to stay out of trouble in this area
is to avoid direct contacts with competitors on these questions, and to seek
information through publicly available channels. It would also appear to
be safe to ask third parties for the necessary input, for instance business
consultants, or customers, who also deal with the competitor and therefore
know his prices.
Collusive pricing may also occur in the context of a distribution network,
where the manufacturer and his distributors jointy establish the selling price
for the product that is subject to the distribution agreement. This can hap-
pen in various ways, and most of the cases falling into this category will
likely take a subtle, indirect approach rather than a straightforward agree-
3 Court of Justice in the Sugar case, at 8179 (paragraph 174 of the original judgment).
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ment to fix prices. An instructive case is the Commission's 1972 decision
regarding the pricing scheme employed by Pittsburgh Corning Europe34 and
its Dutch and Belgian distributors. The Commission had started, on its
own initiative, an investigation under Article 3, Regulation 17/62, against
Pittsburgh Corning Europe (PCE) for possible violation of Article 85,
Treaty of Rome. PCE then requested a negative clearance under Article 2,
Regulation 17/62, for its pricing policy or, in the alternative, an exemption
pursuant to Article 85(3). The background of the case was as follows.
PCE manufactured, solely in Belgium, an insulating material called cel-
lular glass which it sold through its own subsidiary in Germany, and
through independent dealers in Holland and Belgium. Prices for cellular
glass were distinctively different between various EEC countries, going up to
40 percent higher in Germany than in Belgium at certain times. PCE tried
to maintain these price differences and to shield its German subsidiary from
lower priced imports of cellular glass from other EEC countries. The
means employed for this purpose were simple. PCE controlled the ultimate
destinations of its shipments of cellular glass from its plant in Belgium,
based on the orders it received from its Dutch and Belgian distributors, by
requiring the distributor to indicate the country in which the cellular glass
was intended to be used. It is not clear from the decision whether PCE
actually refused to deliver cellular glass to the Belgian or Dutch distributor
where the construction site was to be Germany, but it is apparent that they
applied pressure to prevent exports to Germany. In spite of these measures,
there were substantial parallel imports of PCE's cellular glass into Ger-
many from both Belgium and Holland, in particular during 1970.
In order to stop these parallel imports, PCE revised its price system as of
October 1, 1970 and adopted a change in product pricing. It caused the
Dutch and Belgian distributors to implement a new price list for their
respective territories, thereby greatly increasing the price for cellular glass.
However, the new price lists contained a clause granting a 20 percent dis-
count on all sales where it was shown that the cellular glass was actually
used at a construction site in Belgium or Holland, respectively. This domes-
tic use bonus allowed the Dutch and Belgian firms to continue their busi-
ness basically unchanged at the old price levels, but it was operating at the
same time to disincent exports of cellular glass to Germany by making such
exports financially unattractive. The increase in Dutch and Belgian list
prices, plus the substantial cost of shipping cellular glass from those coun-
tries to Germany had just about equalized the cost to the German customer
who was looking to make his purchases abroad as compared to local sup-
plies. At this point, the EEC Commission stepped in and started to
investigate.
34Commission Decision of November 23, 1972; OJ No. L 272 of December 5, 1972; (CCH)
§ 9539.
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The Pittsburgh Corning decision shows that in cases like this a negative
clearance for distribution systems utilizing such price lists cannot be
obtained. The Commission held that the system resulted in a deliberate
price discrimination for cellular glass, according to the country of destination.
This allowed PCE to continue to charge its German customers, through its
subsidiary in Germany, substantially higher prices than they would nor-
mally pay. The implementation of new price lists in Belgium and Holland
was seen by the Commission as a concerted practice between PCE and its
distributors in these countries, prohibited by Article 85(1). In the case of
the Dutch distributor, the legal significance of the company's behavior was
seen in its "tacit consent or its cooperation, even if it was only by way of
preparing a new price list and sending it to PCE for approval. ' 35 This, the
Commission said, constituted enough of a collusion between two independ-
ent companies to violate the price fixing prohibition of Article 85. And it
did not help the Dutch distributor to claim that he believed he had to com-
ply with PCE's new pricing policy for fear that his distribution contract
might be cancelled by PCE, otherwise. 3 6
Pittsburgh Corning also stands for a futile attempt to justy price difer-
ences for the given product in this case among various EEC countries.
PCE's request to exempt its pricing policy under Article 85(3) was denied
by the Commission because all three reasons given by the company for the
higher prices in Germany were unconvincing. PCE's reasons were:
(1) The extent of the territory covered by its German subsidiary (in com-
parison with that of the Dutch and Belgian dealer) obliges Deutsche Pitts-
burgh Coming to maintain a costly, much larger sales force involving
multiple cost; (2) the fact that Deutsche Pittsburgh Corning sells only the
company's cellular glass, but no other revenue producing products, makes it
entirely dependent on the prices charged in Germany for cellular glass;
(3) the necessity to offer its German customers an onerous technical assist-
ance, which they customarily require in contrast to Belgian or Dutch cus-
tomers, imposes an additional cost factor on doing business in Germany.
PCE claimed that these three factors combined to elevate the cost of sell-
ing cellular glass in Germany to a much higher level than in Belgium or Hol-
land. Therefore, a higher price was justified in Germany. As its profit
margin in Germany was very low, PCE added, the import of its cellular
glass at the lower Dutch or Belgian prices would cause it great economic
harm. It must be noted that all of PCE's reasons advanced to justify the
price difference in Germany were company-internal reasons. Thus, the
argument put forward by PCE in defense of its price system can be
expressed differently as follows: Unless the company is permitted to con-
tinue business the way it is doing it now, it would lose money, and possibly
go out of business.
"Id at 9205.
"Cf. discussion of this point regarding economic pressure put on distributors by a manufac-
turer in the decision, at 9205.
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The Commission gave an unmistakable answer. "These arguments...
do not justify the granting of an exemption for a concerted practice that is
so contrary to the objectives of the Treaty of Rome as the practice of isolat-
ing a national market within the Common Market in order to be more free
to use that market for one's own purposes. ' 37 The Commission added that
it could never be regarded as an improvement in the distribution of goods
(as required for Article 85(3) application), when consumers in one EEC
country are deprived "of the opportunities to obtain supplies at lower prices
in another part of the Common Market.", Thus, a company'spricingpolicy
which prevents the opportunity of shopping elsewhere in the community
through the imposition of financial disincentives for imports or exports is
illegal under EEC law, when implemented in concert with another com-
pany.38 As was demonstrated in Pittsburgh Corning, it is not necessary that
the collusion between the two companies takes the form of a contract, or a
similarly formal arrangement. It is entirely sufficient, if one company
designs the restrictive price system and the other simply agrees to apply it.
Pittsburgh Corning lends authority to one additional statement. Company-
internal reasons such as the size of an organization and its related cost, or
the type of services offered, cannot be used to justify an exemption pursuant
to Article 85(3), in order to maintain price differences between EEC
countries.
Another classic example belonging in this category of illegal pricing prac-
tices is provided by the Commission's 1977 decision in Distillers Ltd 3 9
Here, the price terms of the British company were such that allowances and
rebates usually granted to U.K. customers were not extended to them if
they exported the spirits to other EEC countries. The result was that a
dealer wishing to export Scotch whisky had to pay Distillers Ltd. approxi-
mately double the amount which was due for purchases made for resale in
the U.K. The company tried to justify the higher prices for whisky in other
EEC countries by the high local cost for its dealers. Distillers pointed, in
particular, to high outlays for sales promotion in those countries. This
argument, of course, was very similar to the one which Pittsburgh Corning
had used five years earlier. It was equally unsuccessful. Pricing based on
country destination amounts to an indirect export ban, said the Commission,
"which is as detrimental to the establishment of a common market as the
direct prohibitions .. .and certainly as effective in restricting parallel
exports."'4
0
No discussion of collusive pricing practices would be complete without
mentioning export restrictions, implemented by a manufacturer in open or
"Id. at 9207.
38Where such a policy is implemented by a company unilaterally, the practice is equally
illegal under Article 86, if that company is in a dominant position, provided the other prereq-
uisites of Article 86 are present.
39Commission Decision of December 20, 1977; OJ No. L 50 of February 22, 1978, p. 16;
(CCH) § 10,011.
'°Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), point 125.
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tacit agreement with his distributors in other member states, to maintain
dfferentprice levels which may exist historically between the countries. In
fact, all cases decided by the EEC Commission in connection with export
restrictions are, without exception, also examples of collusive pricing inas-
much as they represent cases of indirect price fixing in favor of the usually
high prices in the country, which is being protected from parallel imports
through the specific export prohibition.4 1 The price fixing element is more
or less evident in these cases, depending on the individual arrangements
made in the specific case; but it is always present, as it is the prime motiva-
tion in these instances to preserve artificially the existing price differences
between the countries, or to increase them. In other words, the companies
involved establish their price according to the pre-existing price level for a
product of the kind they want to sell in a given member state, and then try to
avoid this price levelfrom being eroded through parallel imports from low-
price member states by adopting exportprohibitions. Such a pricing practice
is squarely illegal under Article 85(1). Surprisingly enough, though, there
are still firms around that attempt to do just this. In the words of the Com-
mission, commenting on its Pioneer decision of 1979, these are firms "that
steadfastly refuse to accept the Community as a single market; they take
measures to preserve artificial price differences for a given product as
between different Member States, to the detriment of the consumer."'42 In
these cases, the Commission ordinarily imposes heavy fines on the compa-
nies involved, unless special mitigating circumstances warrant an exception.
The fines in the Pioneer case, totalling almost $10 million and representing
by far the largest fine ever imposed under EEC law in a single case, provide
a clear signal that the Commission's patience with this kind of pricing prac-
tice and business conduct is exhausted.
Abusive Pricing
EEC antitrust law, like other trade regulation laws elsewhere in the
world, concerns itself with the relationship between the position of certain
companies on the market and their pricing policy. The focus is on a com-
pany's economic strength and the possible influence this might have during
the process in which the company establishes the prices for its products and
services. Where competitive forces are lacking to provide checks and bal-
ances necessary to control a company's power to price its products discre-
tionally, the public relies upon the law to create the safeguards that are
deemed desirable to prevent a company from taking undue advantage of its
economic strength in relation to its product pricing. In the EEC, this desire
has manifested itself in two distinct prohibitions: First, it is prohibited to
impose, directly or indirectly, unfair purchase or selling prices, Article
"'Cf. As an example, Commission decision of December 14, 1979; OJ No. L 60 of March 5,
1980; Pioneer Electronic Europe; (CCH) § 10,185.42Comp. Rep. 1979 (Ninth), point 99.
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86(2)(a), Treaty of Rome. Secondly, it is prohibited to apply dissimilar con-
ditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage, Article 86(2)(c). In other words, unfair
pricing as well as discriminatorypricing is illegal in the EEC, provided that
the company applying such a practice is in a dominant position, and further
provided that this practice may affect trade between EEC countries.
Unfair pricing is not defined anywhere in the law. However, it is clear
from the legislative history as well as common interpretations by other writ-
ers that Article 86(2)(a) seeks to prevent the situation in which a dominant
firm is able to exact a price for its product or service from its trading part-
ners which it would not have obtained had it not been in a position of
economic strength vis-A-vis the contracting party.43 Such a price is usually
higher than the one established under effective competitive pressure.
Therefore, it is commonly understood that an unfair price is an excessively
high price, and the prevailing view regarding unreasonably low prices
seems to be that they are not covered by the prohibition in Article 86(2)(a).
As was stated before, unreasonably low, or predatory prices have not
presented any problems in EEC law, yet.44 But there can hardly be any
doubt that a predatory price by a dominant company is prohibited by Arti-
cle 86, because it has anticompetitive effects inasmuch as it makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for smaller nondominant firms to compete. Whether
subparagraph (2)(a) covers such a pricing practice, as some writers sug-
gest,45 or whether it falls into the category of general abuses committed
against competitors, which are prohibited by Article 86(1),46 is a debate of
largely academic interest. For the international businessman it suffices to
know that predatory prices are equally prohibited by EEC law.
These general comments make it clear that the abuse discussed here is of
exploitative character. By definition, such abuses can only be committed by
dominant firms, as exploitation is not possible where effective competition
exists, at least not in a well established market with many participants.
Therefore, the Commission will conclude that a company is in a dominant
position, where unfair prices are sustained over a period of time by a given
company. It will constitute no defense that the unfair price, which was
charged in a specific situation, has had no anticompetitive effects; exploita-
"In agreement TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, at 43; cf. also SMIT AND HERZOG, THE LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (Matthew Bender, New York 1976) at point 86.16
(Vol. 2). The Court of Justice itself has endorsed this view in United Brands; cf discussion of
this case, infra.
"See the comments at the beginning of this article. This situation explains why no discus-
sion exists in Europe as to what "predatory" means. For practical purposes it appears reason-
able to adopt the definition suggested by Areeda, Turner in the U.S.A.; supra note 6.45M. Siragusa, The Application of Article 86 to the Pricing Policy of Dominant Companies.-
Discriminatory and Unfair Prices; COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1979, 179 et seq., at 185. Also SMIT
AND HERZOG; supra note 43, at point 86.16 (Vol. 2).
"The Court of Justice has decided unmistakably that abuses against competitors are covered
by Article 86 as much as abuses against consumers; cf. Continental Can; (CCH) § 8171 at
8300; also Commercial Solvents, (CCH) § 8209 at 8821.
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tive abuses are prohibited by EEC law even though they do not have any
adverse effect on competitors.47 Usually this is not the case, because exces-
sive prices just add to the financial strength of the dominant firm that
charges such prices, and they may drain the resources of the customers; but
as long as those customers do not sell the overpriced goods in competition
with the dominant firm or others, the practice of charging unfair prices has
no anticompetitive effect. It is a unique feature of European antitrust laws,
notably including EEC law, that such practices are nevertheless
prohibited.48
A rare case of allegedly unfair prices, which, at the same time, had the
alleged effect of eliminating a competitor, came before the Commission and
the Court of Justice in 1975. In National Carbonizing Co. v. Commission49 a
British producer of domestic coke (the National Carbonizing Company)
had complained to the Commission, under the provisions of the ECSC
Treaty,50 that the National Coal Board in the U.K., which held a dominant
position for both coal and coke in that country, was exploiting its dominance
by selling its output at suchprices that NCC as a dependent competitor could
no longer make aprofit and survive in business. NCC bought its coal for
making domestic coke from the U.K. National Coal Board; the National
Coal Board sold domestic coke in competition with NCC. The specific
complaint made by NCC stated that it was forced out of business because
the margin between the price it had to pay for coal in order to make domes-
tic coke and the market price for the coke (both prices being fixed by the
National Coal Board) was insufficient to allow an independent coke pro-
ducer to survive.
The Commission did not act, initially, upon NCC's complaint as it had
concluded that the National Coal Board did not abuse its dominant posi-
tion on the U.K. market for coal by pricing its coal as high as it did. The
key reason appears to have been the fact that the Coal Board was selling its
"Note the difference in the text of the law between Article 86(2)(a) and Article 86(2)(c). The
latter provision specifically refers to competitive disadvantages as a result of the pricing prac-
tice, the former does not.
"
4This appears to be the reason why many writers with a common law background continue
to call European antitrust law "consumer oriented," or tilted towards "consumer protection,"
although this distinction (as opposed to the preference which U.S. antitrust law seemingly
gives to the protection of competition) has become a matter of the past. See for instance, the
judgments of the EEC Court of Justice cited in note 46, supra. The historical explanation for
the phenomenon of separately prohibiting exploitation by dominant firms through unfair
prices is found in the origin of European laws against unfair competition, as described in the
introduction of this article.
49Court of Justice, Case 109/75; no decision taken as the case was withdrawn by plaintiff.
However, interim measures were ordered by the President of the Court before a decision on
the merits could be taken. The case is reported in Comp. Rep. 1975 (Fifth), point 77, and
Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), points 148, 149.
'°European Coal and Steel Community; Article 66(7) of this treaty requires the Commission
to intervene whenever a dominant firm abuses its dominance for purposes incompatible with
the treaty objectives. By analogy, comments of the Commission made in reference to the
ECSC prohibition of abuse of a dominant position can be applied to Article 86, Treaty of
Rome.
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coal at a loss, despite its prices. The Commission felt that even a dominant
company cannot have the duty to make a loss, or to aggravate a financial loss
already incurred, in order toprovide aproit for a customer to avoid exclud-
ing him from the market.5 ' However, the President of the Court of Justice,
upon NCC's application, made an order ruling that the Commission should
take such interim measures as it deemed strictly necessary for the survival
of NCC until appeal proceedings before the Court could be completed.
Following this, the Commission took a decision, 52 ordering the Coal Board
to reduce its price of coal supplied to NCC temporarily by £ 2.79 per ton.
In its decision disposing of this temporary issue in the National Carbon-
izing case, the Commission was thus squarely faced with the question
whether a dominant supplier of raw materials has an obligation to price its
product in such a way that a dependent competitor for a derivative product
may stay in business. The first issue in this connection is, of course, the
supplier's duty to continue deliveries to the competitor. That issue had been
decided over a year earlier by the Court of Justice in Commercial Solvents v.
Commission,53 and the Court had left no doubts that such a duty exists.
Accordingly, the Commission started out by declaring that "an undertaking
which is in a dominant position as regards the production of a raw material
(in this case coking coal) and therefore able to control its price to independ-
ent manufacturers of derivatives (in this case coke) and which itself pro-
duces the same derivatives in competition with these manufacturers, may
abuse its dominant position if it acts in such a way as to eliminate competi-
tion from these manufacturers in the market for the derivatives." Going on
to the specific question ofpricing aproduct in this type of situation, the Com-
mission said that the dominant company, "may have an obligation to
arrange its prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient competitor for the der-
ivatives a margin sufficient to enable it to survive in the long term." Con-
cluding from its own decision, the Commission later emphasized 54 that a
dominant firm must price those products which it has to supply to its cus-
tomers as a result of its dominance 55 in a way which allows the customer a
reasonable profit to stay in business long term, even if this customer is a
competitor.
It is unfortunate that National Carbonizing Co. was never decided by the
Court of Justice, but the Commission's comments on the case as well as its
initial reluctance to take any action against the U.K. National Coal Board
"Cf. TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, at 61.
"Commission Decision of October 29, 1975; OJ No. L 35 of February 10, 1976; p. 6. This
decision has not been reported in CCH. The Commission's own comments appear in Comp.
Rep. 1975 (Fifth), point 77.
11(CCH) § 8209 at 8820 (paragraph 25 of the original judgment).
'Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), point 28.
"The duty to supply, or reversely stated, the prohibition on refusal to deal, which was
expressly confirmed by the Court in Commercial Solvents has since been reiterated in United
Brands v. Commission, (CCH) § 8429, at 7714 (paragraphs 182 and 183 of the original
judgment).
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allow the following conclusion. It will be considered unfair pricing, i.e., an
abuse prohibited by Article 86(2)(a), !f a dominant manufacturer sets the
price for a product, which he is bound to supply to his customers, in such a
way that theprice is too high for a dependent competitor in the market for a
derivative product to make aprofit and stay in business long term, although
the competitor is reasonably efficient. On the other hand, a dominant firm
is not obliged seriously to damage its own business, in particular not to risk
its own existence, in order to keep a competitor alive. 56 This means that a
price, which would otherwise be "unfair" and therefore abusive, is lawful
where it is the dominant firm's only possible price to avoid serious damage
to its own financial position. For practical purposes, this must mean that
the dominant firm itself is allowed a reasonable profit on the price in ques-
tion, provided it operates its business efficiently, itself.
When the Court of Justice, in November 1975, finally had to rule on the
issue of unfairpricing in GeneralMotors v. Commission, 57 it gave the follow-
ing definition for this type of abuse: "Such an abuse might lie, inter alia, in
the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic
value of the service provided, and which has the effect of curbing parallel
imports by neutralizing the possibly more favourable level of prices apply-
ing in other sales areas in the Community, or by leading to unfair trade in
the sense of Article 86(2)(a)." This language indicates that theprice, in order
to be unfair in the meaning of Article 86(2)(a), must be gross/y disproportion-
ate to the value given by the seller, not just higher than a normal market
price that can reasonably be expected for a product or service of the kind in
question. It has been suggested to use the customer's dependence upon the
particular product in a given case as a means of measurement at which level
a price becomes unfair, with a higher degree of dependence calling for a
lower level of illegality, as "there is greater scope for exploitation or domi-
nance over necessary goods than over unnecessary luxuries." s5 8 This dis-
tinction makes good sense, although it leaves the question, what are
necessary goods as opposed to unnecessary luxuries. As long as any subjec-
tive preference in this connection is excluded from the analysis, however, it
should be possible to come to generally agreeable results with this yardstick
of measurement in any given case.
In GeneralMotors, the Court reversed the Commission's decision in light
of the special circumstances of the case. While agreeing with the Commis-
"In agreement TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, at 61/62.
"Judgment of November 13, 1975; case 26/75; (CCH) § 8320, at 7735 (paragraph 12 of the
original judgment). In an earlier judgment of 1971, Sirena S.r.Z v. Eda GmbH, Case 40/70,
judgment of February 18, 1971; CCH § 8101, the Court had avoided to state with ahy preci-
sion what an unfair price might be. But the Justices defined already then, "as for the abusive
exploitation of a dominant position," that "the price level of a product is not in itself necessar-
ily indicative of such abuse, but it can be a decisive indication where it is particularly high and
is not justified by the facts" (at 7112). Three years later, in 1974, the issue came before the
Court, again. In Sacchi (ex parte), CCH § 8267, the Justices merely repeated the text of the
law, however, providing no further guidance on the question of unfair pricing; cf. p. 9185-4.
"
8TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, at 46.
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sion, in principle, that charges imposed by GM on its customers for the
inspection service in question had constituted an abuse, the Court quashed
the decisionfor three reasons. First, the activity was a new and unusual one
enthrusted upon GM by Belgian law. Secondly, this activity represented
only a very minor portion of GM's overall business. Thirdly, and most
importantly, GM had stopped the illegal charges as soon as customers com-
plained and before the Commission opened its proceedings, and it had
refunded the overpaid amounts. The Court held that "this conduct on the
part of [General Motors] . . .cannot be regarded as an 'abuse' within the
meaning of Article 86." The judgment shows that a straightforward, "good
guy" approach can help even in cases where a technical violation of the law
has already been committed. As an "aside," it is noteworthy that neither the
Commission nor the Court took issue with the fact that GM applied substan-
tially higher service charges than the ones adopted for European imports in
all cases, where GM cars were imported directlyfrom America and had to be
inspected for road safety in Belgium just like the imports from other EEC
countries. In fact, the price originally charged by GM for inspection of
EEC imports was identical to the charge in cases of U.S. imports, and that
price was held to be abusive both by the Commission and the Court when
applied to European imports. The justification for the difference in price
was apparently seen in the "real economic cost of the operation."
The leading case on pricing in EEC law is undoubtedly United Brands v.
Commission ." It addresses both unfair pricing and discriminatory pricing.
Dealing first with the subject of unfair prices, what was said in relation to
the proper definition of this term at the beginning of this section, should be
repeated. Article 86(2)(a) has been interpreted for a long time to mean that
a dominant company must be prevented from taking advantage of its eco-
nomic strength in such a way so as to obtain a price which, had it not been
dominant, it would not have been able to obtain. The Court, in United
Brands, fully endorsed this view by holding that in assessing a particular
pricing practice in light of the prohibition in Article 86(2)(a), it is advisable,
"to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has made use of the oppor-
tunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading
benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been normal and suffi-
ciently effective competition. In this case, charging aprice which is excessive
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product
supplied is such an abuse."'60
Both the General Motors and the United Brands judgments have thus
defined the abuse of charging unfair prices as charging excessive prices, and
the standard to determine the excess has been, in both cases, the relationship
between the actual selling price and the economic value of the goods sup-
plied or services rendered. This standard, of course, is not very practical for
"Judgment of February 14, 1978, Case 27/76; (CCH) § 8429.60Id at 7718 (paragraphs 249, 250 of the original judgment). Emphasis added.
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determining objectively in every single case whether an excess exists, and if
so, to what extent. The term "economic value" is too vague to withstand
subjectively motivated disagreements. Recognizing this deficiency of its
own definition, the Court went out of its way in United Brands and pro-
vided unusually detailed guidance regarding the determination of the excess
price. Although it left itself the option for full flexibility in future cases,6'
the Court basically endorsed a cost/price ratio as the appropriate method of
establishing whether a particular price is unfair: "This excess could, inter
alia, be determined objectively. . . by making a comparison between the
selling price of the product in question and its cost of production, which
would disclose the amount of the profit margin; . . . The question there-
fore to be determined is whether the difference between the costs actually
incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to
this question is in the affirmative, to consider whether a price has been
imposed which is unfair in itself or when compared to competing
products." 62
Having failed to prove United Brands' production cost in this particular
case, the Commission lost again on the count of unfair pricing, as it had
done before (for different reasons) in GeneralMotors. Thus, no Court deci-
sion exists to this date which holds a company responsible for having
abused its dominant position by charging unfair prices. However, the
ground rules have been laid out in United Brands well enough to make it
relatively easy for the Commission to bring a case for violation of the unfair
pricing prohibition in the future and to succeed on the merits. The interna-
tional businessman must be aware of the fact that such a case will definitely
result in a detailed investigation of the company's production cost. The rea-
son is that the Court itself has declared that the Commission, in a case like
this, is "under a duty to require [the company under investigation] to pro-
duce particulars of all the constituent elements of its production costs."' 6 3
Surely, a debate will arise in such a situation between the Commission and
the company involved regarding the composition of the production costs for
a specific product. The Court of Justice is obviously aware of the doiculties
in working out production costs due to the apportionment of indirect costs and
general expenditure, which a company, at its discretion, may legitimately
add to the direct (and more easily traceable) cost of production. In United
Brands the Court acknowledged that these indirect costs "may vary signifi-
cantly" from case , case, and it volunteered a number of reasons which
may prove helpful to the businessman, who wants to debate with the Com-
mission whether a particular cost element is, or is not, part of the produc-
"In trying to provide a workable standard to determine the excess, and picking the cost/
price ratio, the Court added the following disclaimer: "Other ways may be devised-and eco-
nomic theorists have not failed to think up several--of selecting the rules for determining
whether the price of a product is unfair." Id (paragraph 253 of the original judgment).
"
2Id (paragraphs 25 I, 252 of the original judgment).
"Id (paragraph 256 of the original judgment).
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tion cost for a specific product. The Court held 64 that the indirect cost
apportionment legitimately depends upon at least sixfactors; (1) the size of
the company; (2) its object of business; (3) the complexity of its set up;
(4) its territorial area of operations; (5) whether it manufactures one or
several products; and (6) the number of its subsidiaries and their relation-
ship with each other.
Discriminatory Pricing in EEC law is generally referred to as the offense,
prohibited by Article 86(2)(c), of maintaining deliberate and artificialprice
differences between the member states for a given product. This practice is
illegal only, where it has anticompetitive character, as can be deduced from
the text of the law. In addition, it must be emphasized at the outset that
there are still a number of structural differences between the various
national markets in the community which make it "totally unrealistic to
assume that prices could be uniform throughout the Common Market. ' 65
Price dfferences, therefore, do not mean much and are certainly not illegal in
and of themselves under EEC law; there may well be objective reasons for
the variance in a given case. The Court of Justice itself has acknowledged,
in United Brands, that differences in certain business conditions "may even-
tually culminate in different retail selling price levels" in the various mem-
ber states, and has provided a number of factors as illustrative examples of
justification for such price differences: (1) transport costs; (2) national taxa-
tion; (3) customs duties; (4) local wages and other labor costs; (5) national
conditions of marketing; (6) the parity of currencies, and (7) the density of
local competition.66 The Commission has expanded on this thought since
then and added a few more reasons why country prices may justifiably be
different in the Community; (8) price control in some countries; (9) price
cuts ordered by public authorities; and (10) subsequent changes in currency
parities.67
Consequently, it can be concluded, before further comments are made
with respect to the abuse of price discrimination in the EEC, that it is per-
fectly all right, in principle, for a company to charge different prices for its
products and services in different member states. The international busi-
nessman should not concern himself too much with noisy accusations
against multinational enterprises by certain political groups in Europe and
would-be price regulators, which occur at frequent intervals, 6 8 at least not
'Id (paragraph 254 of the original judgment).
6 Commission Answer to Written Question No. 194/79 by Mr. Schyns, Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament; OJ No. C 214 of August 27, 1979; p. 21; CCH § 10,161 at 10,486. The Com-
mission had expressed similar views in other responses to parliamentary questions as early as
1974; cf. answer to Written Question No. 457/74 of November 29, 1974; OJ No. C 7 of Janu-
ary 10, 1975; 5 (re prices charged by Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft).
"Id. at 7716 (paragraph 228 of the original judgment).67C the Commission's answer to Written Question No. 654/78; supra note 3, at 10,365.
"A classic example appears to be Written Question No. 194/79, supra note 65. The opening
sentence of that parliamentary question has a catchy, political undertone: "Although Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty have been in force for 20 years, the price of a given product still varies
enormously from one Member State to another."
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from a legal point of view. By now, there is enough authority in EEC anti-
trust law to defend successfully price differences that are caused by, or
based on objective reasons, such as the ones mentioned above. In addition,
it helps that it is often difficult to carry out a meaningful comparison of
prices in the first place, even for identical products, because of differences in
trade forms and patterns as well as consumer habits among the member
states. 69 This may explain why the Commission has taken a relatively cool
approach to the widespread phenomenon of price disparities in the com-
munity.70 The business executive should be much more concerned about
situations in which the same price is charged for an identical product
throughout the EEC, if the costs are traceably different between various
member states (as they probably are). There is nothing wrong legally, if a
company decides to treat the ten EEC countries as one single market
financially and averages its costs accordingly so as to be able to charge one
uniform price throughout the Common Market. However, where this pric-
ing practice is not applied, it may well constitute an abuse, if a dominant firm
charges an identical price for a given product in all member states despite
substantially different costs in some countries. 7 1
The assessment that differential pricing by a dominant company, i.e.,
charging different prices in different EEC countries, isprincpally not objec-
tionable under community law is also true, where such a pricing practice is
motivated by a locally different strength of competitors. Even before the
Court of Justice unequivocally confirmed in United Brands, that price dif-
ferences between member states may be justified by "the density of compe-
tition. . . according to the Member States," the Commission had publicly
admitted that price variations are an essential part of the competitive pro-
cess and that it is therefore not pursuing the objective to put an end to such
differences. 72 United Brands provides additional authority in this connec-
tion in that the judgment made it clear that dominantfirms, like other com-
panies, are entitled to protect their own commercial interests if they are
attacked, and that such firms "must be conceded the right to take such rea-
sonable steps as [they deem] appropriate to protect [their] interests."'73 Such
steps include the right, without any doubt, to adjust product prices to locally
prevailing prices of competitors,74 but not necessarily to undercut them.
9Cf. the Commission's own comments in this respect in its answer to Written Question
No. 194/79, id. at 10,486.
"'Cf Comp. Rep. 1976 (Sixth), points 45-52; and Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), points 1-4.
"The price might be below cost in some areas of the EEC and thus predatory where it
impacts competition, Article 86(1). In agreement, generally, TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6; at
72.
71Cf Comp. Rep. 1977 (Seventh), Introduction p. 10.
71d at 7714 (paragraph 189 of the original judgment).
"In agreement A. Deringer, Missbrduchliche Preise markibeherrschender Unternehmen,
REVUE SUISSE Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE Nos. 6, 7 (May, September
1979); p. 31. TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, has taken the position that differential pricing has
exclusionary effects and is illegal where a dominant firm charges low prices in some parts of
the EEC "to discourage potential entrants, or to punish and exclude actual entrants," even
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One cannot be too specific as to how close the dominant firm may set its
price vis-A-vis a competitor's price, be it in response to a competitive price
action, including the competitor's first appearance on the market, or be it
during the original phase of establishing the dominant firm's own product
price. But there can be no violation of Article 86, as long as the competitor
is allowed to maintain a profitable price level and stay in business long
term, provided his product is based on equal or comparable technology in
the case of technical products, and further provided that the competitor
runs its business operations in a reasonably efficient manner. This implies
the possibility that a company, even if it is in a dominant position may, on
occasion, undercut competitive prices, if its own costs allow it to do so at a
reasonable profit, comparable to its profitability in other product areas.
This will be the case, for instance, where product innovations or complete
technology breakthroughs occur.
The legally permissible flexibility for a dominant company in its product
pricing with regard to competitive prices, which is described here, finds its
ultimate confirmation in United Brands. Here, the Court made a general
comment as regards product pricing in a heterogeneous market such as the
EEC, considering the remaining structural differences between the coun-
tries, one of which is, of course, the density of local competition. The Court
held that the dominant firm, provided "it complies with the rules for the
regulation and coordination of the market laid down by the Treaty," is in
fact permitted to "endeavour to take 'what the market can bear.' -75 What
the market can bear in the individual member state depends, of course, on
local price levels, which in turn result from competitive activity. This is just
another way of saying that a dominant company may price its products and
services according to local circumstances, including competitive prices,
which it finds in the different member states. However, a strong note of
caution must be added at this point. Price discrimination with anticompeii-
tive character is, after all, prohibited by Article 86(2)(c). The Court itself
made the proviso in the context of its general endorsement of the dominant
firm's flexibility to price according to local circumstances. This can only be
done with impunity, said the Court, if the dominant firm observes the treaty
rules regarding the "regulation and coordination" of the Common Market.
This is a clear reminder that Article 86 establishes the limitsfor the dominant
firm'sflexibility in any situation of differential pricing.
Obviously, the line is difficult to draw between permitted differential
pricing and illegal price discrimination. The determination will depend on
all the circumstances of a particular situation and will require a case-by-case
where such prices are above cost, but below normally acceptable rates of return; id at 66. This
analysis coincides with the view supported in the text, with the exception that the abuse, in this
author's view, would appear to be more of an anticompetitive abuse (with undertones of
unfairness), prohibited by Article 86(1), rather than a violation of the unfair pricing prohibi-
tion under Article 86(2)(a) that Temple Lang seems to advocate. This distinction, however,
has no practical implications.
"At 7716 (paragraph 227 of the original judgment).
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analysis. The businessman's intent, however, is not one of those circum-
stances to be considered. It is excludedfrom the determination whether or not
an abuse ispresent, because abuse under Article 86 constitutes an objective
concept. 76 Since it is a case-by-case determination, the Commission has
made no attempt to establish general criteria for all cases to determine
whether the pricing policy of a dominant company constitutes an abuse,7 7
nor can the Court of Justice be expected to do so. The appropriate advice
to the international businessman in this area is therefore that he must tread
carefully and certainly not try to push the limits of the flexibility that he is
generally allowed with respect to pricing his products in the various coun-
tries of the community. This may not be much of a practical advice, but
then it must be remembered that EEC law provides only one meaningful
precedent so far as to discriminatory pricing.78 This precedent is, again, the
Court's landmark decision in United Brands. Here, a company had tried,
without objective justification, to charge "what the market can bear,"and it
failed profoundly, thereby violating Article 86(2)(c).
United Brands which sells, among other goods, bananas under the
brandname Chiquita, was found to have violated the prohibition contained
in Article 86(2)(c) by charging each week, without objective justification,
prices which differed appreciably according to the country where its cus-
tomers, all of which bought for resale, were located. All bananas were
unloaded in two ports, Rotterdam and Bremerhaven, where unloading costs
were almost equal, and they were sold by United Brands to all its custom-
ers, with the exception of Irish dealers, subject to the same conditions and
payment terms. Transportation cost and duties, if any, were borne by the
customers, as well as all economic risk of resale. When United Brands
defended itspolicy ofpricing according to the final destination of its bananas
by pointing out the prices were determined by the market forces in the
respective member states (which, incidentally, had resulted in price differ-
ences of 80 and up to 138 percent), the Court refusedto accept this explana-
tion. It dismissed the argument simply by stating that United Brands could
not depend on these market forces "since it sells a product which is always
the same and at the same place to ripener/distributors who-alone-bear
the risks of the consumers' market." The Court continued in pointing out
that the interplay of supply and demand can only be applied to that stage of the
economic process where it is really manifest. And it concluded that "the
mechanisms of the market are adversely affected if the price is calculated by
"Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, judgment of February 13, 1979; Case 85/76; (CCH)
§ 8527, at 7553. However, where exclusionary intent on the part of a dominant firm can be
proved, abuse will almost certainly be present. The intent, in other words, is not a decisive
criterion for the existence of abuse, but it can present additional evidence.
17Comp. Rep. 1976 (Sixth), point 46.78Earlier decisions of the Court in the area of industrial property rights such as Deutsche
Grammophon Y. Metro SB Grossmirkte, Case 78/70; judgment of June 8, 1971; CCH § 8106,
have touched on the subject but do not yield much with respect to the determination whether
or not illegal price discrimination is exercised by a dominant company in a given case.
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leaving out one stage of the market and taking into account the law of sup-
ply and demand as between the vendor and the ultimate consumer and
not as between the vendor (UBC) and the purchaser (the ripener/
distributors). '79
The result of United Brands' differential product pricing was a rigid par-
titioning of national markets, at price levels which were artificially different,
placing certain distributors at a competitive disadvantage, because they
were, at the same time, under an obligation not to resell bananas as long as
they were green. Given the perishable nature of bananas once they are
ripe, i.e., yellow, some distributors were restrained from taking advantage
of their lower prices and could not compete against other distributors, who
had bought at higher prices from United Brands. The combination of these
two factors (the prohibition on resale of green bananas and the policy of
differential pricing) led to a massive interference by United Brands with the
competition among its customers; in fact, it prevented such competition. It
was this element, in the final analysis, that made the diferentialpricing pol-
icy applied by United Brands an illegal abuse. But it must also be kept in
mind that the Court, in this case, rejected the usually acceptable rationale
for differential pricing, namely the adherence to a pricing methodology
based on local market forces, because United Brands was far removed from
the retail level at which these forces are present.
The judgment in United Brands, therefore, provides clear authority for
the following three conclusions with respect to the abuse of discriminatory
pricing. First,price diferentiation according to member states, practiced by
a dominant company, is illegal where it is supported by contractual terms
and conditions, or other business practices (such as deliberately limiting
supplies to a level lower than demand), which effectively restrict the cus-
tomers' ability to export or import the goods in question and which conse-
quently result in a distortion of intra-brand competition.8O The
businessman's natural inclination to select a price which maximizes his
profits (discussed at the beginning of this article) may provide the explana-
tion for attempts to take advantage of different price levels in various mem-
ber states. However, EEC law does not tolerate a profit maximizing scheme
based on differential pricing plus any device that artficially creates, or delib-
erately perpetuates price diferences, between the countries. United Brands is
a classic example of such an illegal scheme, practiced unilaterally by a
dominant firm. The use of industrial property rights, in particular trade-
marks, for the purpose of achieving profit maximization by country through
the exclusion of parallel imports from low price areas in the community is
another example. 8 ' Cases of export restrictions in distribution agreements
are examples in the area of collusive conduct. All of these schemes are
"Id. at 7717 (paragraphs 228-230 of the original judgment).
'Cf. Deringer, supra note 74, at 30, where he discusses increasing problems in EEC law as a
result of such pricing practices. See also note 38, supra.
"Judgment of October 31, 1974; Case 16/74; Centrafarm v. Winthrop; (CCH) § 8247.
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designed to allow the company that implements them greater profits than
could be achieved under effective competitive circumstances. Naturally,
EEC antitrust law seeks to prevent this situation.
The second conclusion from United Brands in this context goes to the
admissibility of arguments in justification of differential pricing by a domi-
nant firm which are based on market forces in the individual country in the
Common Market. United Brands had claimed that its prices were deter-
mined by market forces in the member states and "cannot therefore be dis-
criminatory." As was discussed before, the Court admitted that structural
differences between the national markets can justify price differences
between member states, and it gave a number of examples which together
can be described as "market forces." However, it was made equally clear
by the justices that a company cannot take advantage of local marketforces in
its product pricing, if it is not itself subject to these factors (because it is
removed from that stage of distribution by its own way of operation).
A third conclusion can be derived by recalling that price discrimination
may also contain elements of unfair pricing and that the abuse, which is
generally of anticompetitive character, may become an exploitative abuse
as well when the customer differentiated against is charged an excessive
price.8 2 When it is also recalled that Court and Commission have both
admitted that currency parities and subsequent changes to them can, in
principle, justify price differences between member states, the following sce-
nario presents itself as a potential legal risk for the international business-
man whose company is subjected to severe currencyfluctuations in the EEC.
Provided a dominant company is marketing an identical (or near enough)
product throughout the Common Market and provided fluctuations in the
foreign exchange rates have distorted the original relationship between
prices in the countries, as expressed in a foreign denominator currency,
such as the Japanese yen or the U.S. dollar,83 the situation could occur in
which the dominant firm finds itself under competitive pressure in one part
2 Cf discussion at beginning of this article. See also M. Siragusa, supra note 45, who has
correctly pointed out that the Commission tends to use the existence of price differences
between member states as the basis of alleging unfair pricing (at 190). Siragusa concludes that
the reduction of price differences to levels which can be fully justified on the basis of criteria
acceptable to the Court of Justice (i.e., those mentioned in United Brands) will consequently
result in the elimination of the risk for the dominant company to be held in violation of Article
86 for discriminatory pricing and charging excessive, i.e., unfair prices, at the same time. This
analysis can raise no objections.
3To compare EEC currencies is of no great value because these currencies are closely linked
through the European Monetary System and hardly fluctuate against each other (exception:
Sterling). A hypothetical case may demonstrate how significant the distortion can be: A U.S.
firm introduces a product at $100 in 1970 into the four major EEC countries. The price, in
local currency, is 555 French francs; 366 deutschmarks; 62,500 Italian lire; and 42 pounds
sterling. Five years later, after various currency realignments, the same product would cost
422 francs and 234 marks in France and Germany, a decrease of 24 and 36 percent, respec-
tively, without any action of the dominant firm. A further three years later, the price in Eng-
land would have moved up to approximately 63 pounds, representing a 50 percent increase
due to sterling's decline against the dollar during that time. In 1980, prices for the English
market were almost back to the original level of 1970, while the price in Germany had
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of the community but not in another. The company may then decide to
take a selective price cut in the country where it is under pressure, but to
leave prices unchanged elsewhere in reliance on the fact that currency
changes are normally accepted as justification for price differences. If the
selective price action, however, results in a signiflcantprice gap between two
or more member states, it is conceivable that the company will be accused of
charging unfair prices in the country where the product price remained
high.84 There does not have to be any effect on competition to prove the
"unfair pricing" offense, and the Commission might use the difference in
price between the low price, competitive market in country A and the cur-
rency-exchange-driven, high-price market in country B as evidence of
abuse. The unfairness of the price in country B might be determined by the
extent of the price difference between A and B.
A similar situation can arise without any action on the part of the domi-
nant firm. Given an extreme development of exchange rates, thepoint can
be reached where the dominant company has an obligation to take corrective
price actions or else face the charge of unfair pricing. This can occur, how-
ever, only if the firm is not subject to special local market forces such as
manufacturing cost and other cost elements influenced by local inflation
which might justify the price difference. Whenever the dominant company
reaches the position that it can "reap trading benefits which it would not
have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective competi-
tion," the company is open to the Commission's challenge of unfair pricing.
Situations are admittedly rare in which currency fluctuations will result in
such a challenge with any prospect of success. Nevertheless, the interna-
tional businessman must be aware of the fact that windfallprofits as a result
of currency fluctuations, sustained over any significant period of time
(months rather than years), can be illegal as a violation of the unfair pricing
prohibition.
A final comment regarding the pricing of products in the EEC has to be
made with respect toprice discounts. There is little precedent in EEC law to
date, but the preceding discussion of differential pricing leaves no doubt
that even a dominant company must bepermitted to pass cost savings it may
realize in certain sales situations, such as bulk deliveries, on to its custom-
ers. 85 The reason is that price differentiation, as represented in a quantity
discount price, can be objectively justified according to the criteria estab-
lished by the Court of Justice in United Brands, the most important of
which is differences in costs. But even where it will not realize a corre-
sponding saving from a quantity sale, the dominant company is not neces-
decreased by a further 25 percent to 177 marks. Today, all these prices would have changed
again.
"In addition, the selective price adjustment may have possible consequences resulting from
anticompetitive effects in the country, where the competition occurred.
"In agreement TEMPLE LANG, supra note 6, at 70. It must be added here that the Commis-
sion's decision against the French tire manufacturer Michelin of October 1981 came after this
article had been written; cf decision of October 7, 1981 (81/969/EEC); (CCH) § 10,340.
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sarily precluded from granting a discount. If it can be shown that a general
industry practice exists, whereby competitors freely grant quantity discounts,
the dominant company should be allowed to do likewise.8 6 This follows from
the right of any company, including the dominant one, to react to competi-
tive conditions. Again, the Court has confirmed this right, in principle, for
the dominant firm in United Brands. To avoid illegal exclusionary effects
on its competitors, the dominant firm will, however, have to arrange its
discount prices carefully. It seems clear that, in these circumstances, it
could not undercut competitive discounted prices with its own prices after
discount. The dominant company must also provide the quantity discount
to anybody who is willing to take delivery of the specified quantity of
goods.
The Court of Justice was faced with the question of discounting of prod-
uct prices on two occasions, but in the slightly changed form offidelity
rebates. Not surprisingly, these discounts were held to be illegal f granted
by a dominant company. In the Sugar87 case the Court declared that it
constitutes an abuse if a dominant company grants rebates which are not
calculated on the actual quantity of purchased goods but on some kind of
scale related to total annual purchases (fidelity rebates), and which are
aimed at preventing customers from buying competing goods. In Hoff-
mann-LaRoche,88 the Court expressed the same thought, holding as an
abuse a quota system of contractual arrangements that induces the cus-
tomer through rebates to buy exclusively, or to a large extent, from the
dominant firm rather than its competitors. It is clear from both decisions
that the interference with inter-brand competition by the dominant company
constitutes the essence of the offense.
In Hoffmann-LaRoche, this concern was expressed squarely by the Court
in the context of dealing with exclusive supply contracts concluded by dom-
inant enterprises. Whether or not they are entered into in consideration of
a fidelity rebate, the Court felt that such obligations are incompatible with
Article 86(2)(b), i.e. the prohibition to limit markets to the prejudice of con-
sumers, because they are designed to deprive the purchaser of, or restrict his
possible choices of, sources of supply and to deny other producers access to
the market. And as regards fidelity rebates, the Justices had this to say:
"The fidelity rebate, unlike quantity rebates exclusively linked with the vol-
ume of purchases from the producer concerned, is designed through the
grant of a financial advantage to prevent customers from obtaining their
"Agreeing, in principle, SMIT AND HERZOG, supra note 43 at point 86.18 (Vol. 2). The
rationale applying here is similar to the "meeting competition" defense known in U.S. antitrust
law under the Robinson-Patman Act. The Michelin decision requires no change in this state-
ment as regards direct sales by dominant firms to end-users. However, it appears to rule out
anything but a cost justification as regards dealer-discounts, at first sight. A careful analysis of
this decision will be required.
"Supra note 19 at 8241 (paragraphs 522, 523, 526, 527 of the original judgment).
"Supra note 76 at 7553 (paragraph 90 of the original judgment).
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supplies from competing producers."'89 It will be noted that this statement,
while unmistakably outlawing fidelity rebates for a dominant firm as a way
of pricing its products, indirectly endorses the idea of quantity discounts. It
is implied that a discount "exclusively linked with the volume of purchases"
in a single transaction can be legal, regardless of the dominant position
occupied by the producer concerned.
